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Available online 20 July 2016Alterations in reinforcement learning and decision making in schizophrenia have been linked with
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) dysfunction, a region critical for weighing reward magnitude in the calculation
of expected value (EV). However, much of this work has used complex tasks that require combined learn-
ing and EV calculation. Here we used a simple “Roulette” task that examined the calculation of EV directly
through a combination of text and/or pictorial representation of reward probability and magnitude. Forty-
four people with schizophrenia and 30 controls were recruited. Patients were less sensitive to adjustments
in a parameter combining probability and magnitude into one EV construct. Breaking down the construct
into independent contributions of probability and magnitude, we found that negative symptoms were as-
sociated with magnitude sensitivity. This is consistent with the hypothesized role of OFC in actively
representing magnitude and the notion that negative symptomsmay involve a failure to appropriately es-
timate and use future reward magnitude to guide decision making.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Patients with schizophrenia exhibit deﬁcits on a range of decision
making and reinforcement learning tasks which often correlate with
negative symptom severity (Gold et al., 2008, 2012; Strauss et al.,
2011a). Howevermany of the studied tasks involvemultiple learning
and decision processes so that the speciﬁc processes implicated in
negative symptoms remain uncertain. For example, the widely used
Iowa gambling task (IGT), requires the calculation of expected value
(EV: reward magnitude multiplied by reward probability) to guide
decisionmaking based on learning from feedback. In general, patients
perform worse than controls on the IGT (Sevy et al., 2007) in a man-
ner that suggests less inﬂuence of EV on deck selection compared to
controls (Brown et al., 2015). However, performance on the IGT is
heavily dependent on risk attitudes, learning reward probabilities
and magnitudes through experience, and reward/punishment sensi-
tivity (Schonberg et al., 2011). Thus, it is not clear if the patient deﬁcitarch Center, Department of
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This is an open access article undeis due to difﬁculties in learning from feedback or actual alterations in
the way information is weighed in guiding choices.
Several studies (Brown et al., 2013; Gold et al., 2013; Heerey and
Gold, 2007; Trémeau et al., 2008) have shown alterations in how pa-
tients represent the value of alternative stimuli or potential responses
using tasks that do not involve feedback learning. For example,
Strauss et al. (2011b) showed reduced transitivity in patients'
preference judgements of picture stimuli. That is, if one prefers A N
B and B N C the preference for A over C should be expected. However,
patients were less likely than controls to show such order prefer-
ences, suggesting less precise value representations. The same pat-
tern is seen in patients with damage to ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC; Fellows and Farah, 2007), an area consistently related
to EV (see Chase et al., 2015). This leads to thepossibility that patients
show less optimal learning from outcomes because they fail to
adequately represent the EV of different alternatives, consistent
with vmPFC/OFC deﬁcits seen in schizophrenia (Barch and Dowd,
2010; Davatzikos et al., 2005). We have shown similar difﬁculties in
the representation of EV in high negative symptom patients during
a reinforcement learning task (Gold et al., 2012).
Using a simpler task inwhichparticipantswere presented directly
with the information necessary to calculate EV, we showed that pa-
tients were resistant to the ‘Framing effect’ (Tversky and Kahneman,r the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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likelihood of accepting a gamble despite certain loss (Brown et al.,
2013), suggesting that patients had reduced loss-aversion due to
poorer tracking of EV (Brown et al., 2013). Interestingly, a number
of high negative symptom patients were excluded because they
failed the ‘catch trials’ (where there was an obvious preferable choice
if participants could compute EV properly), suggesting that these
participants were extremely poor EV calculators.
Recently, Sharp et al. (2012) reported on results from a task that
assesses EV calculation where participants were able to calculate di-
rectly the EV of an option without needing to maintain a representa-
tion of stimulus value from a stored history of reinforcements. In
controls, performance was biased towards the prospect with a com-
paratively higher probability of reward, despite equivalent EV for
high reward magnitude options, consistent with Prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This was formalized through the ad-
dition of two parameters to the initial model that adjust for known
subjective evaluations of probability and magnitude: a ‘Prospect
function’, that modiﬁes rewards magnitude, and a Prelec function
that modiﬁes reward probability. The inclusion of these two modiﬁ-
cations resulted in a reduction of the distance between subjects'
choices and that of a theoretical rational decision-maker. This task
offers a simpliﬁed approach to explore weighting of information for
decision making in schizophrenia, without the need for learning
from feedback.
Using this design, we anticipated a shallower relationship be-
tween EV and behavior in the patient group due to poorer integration
of magnitude information when calculating EV, consistent with a
role for OFC/vmPFC in representing relative reward magnitudes and
OFC/vmPFC deﬁcits observed in schizophrenia. We further anticipate
that this pattern of poor magnitude integration will correlate with
negative symptom severity.Table 1
Demographic, neuropsychological and symptom variables.
HC
(N = 30)
SZ
(N = 44)
Mean SD Mean SD t/χ2 p
Age (y) 40.8 10.4 39.1 10.6 0.7 0.47
Gender (M | F) 22 | 12 34 | 14 0.1 0.73
Haloperidol equivalent dose 9.9 8.0
Number of APs (1 | 2+) 39 | 5
Education (yrs) 15.2 1.9 12.7 2.1 4.9 b0.0001
Maternal education (y) 13.8 2.6 14.0 2.9 −0.3 0.74
Paternal education (y) 14.3 3.5 15.0 3.2 −1.0 0.38
Cognitive ability
WMS forward 9.0 1.8 7.6 2.1 3.4 0.001
WMS back 8.3 1.8 6.8 2.1 3.5 0.001
WASI verbal sum IQ 113.6 10.6 96.5 14.8 5.5 b0.0001
WASI performance sum IQ 112.4 12.6 99.7 14.1 3.8 0.0003
WASI combined IQ 118.2 10.6 100.3 14.3 6.5 b0.0001
WTAR 112.0 9.7 97.6 17.4 4.8 b0.0001
Symptom ratings2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Forty-eight participants with a diagnosis of schizophrenia or
schizoaffective disorder and 34 controls were recruited. Sample
sizes and demographic characteristics are presented in the Results
and Table 1. Patients were clinically and pharmacologically stable
(N4 weeks) outpatients from the Maryland Psychiatric Research
Center or nearby clinics. Diagnosis was determined by the Structured
Clinical Interview for DSM–IV Axis I Disorders (SCID) (First et al.,
1997; Pfohl et al., 1997), past medical records, and clinician reports.
Controls were screened with the SCID and free from a history of
psychosis, current Axis I disorder, and family history of psychosis in
ﬁrst-degree relatives. Participants were excluded based on a history
of drug dependence, neurological disorder, or cognitively impairing
medical disorder. Participants were compensated $15 per hour.
Written and informed consent was obtained from every participant.
Approval was obtained from the University of Maryland IRB.SANS asociality anhedonia 8.0 4.2
SANS role functioning 7.5 4.1
SANS affective blunting 9.2 6.4
SANS alogia 1.3 1.8
SANS total 25.9 13.6
BPRS affect 5.5 2.7
BPRS negative symptoms 6.2 2.6
BPRS reality distortion 7.2 3.0
BPRS disorganization 3.4 1.0
BPRS total 32.3 6.3
BNSS motivation and
pleasure
11.7 6.9
BNSS emotional expressivity 10.5 8.9
BNSS total 21.6 14.22.2. Neuropsychological and symptom measurements
Participants completed a battery of neuropsychological and
symptom assessments including the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of
Intelligence (WASI;Wechsler, 1999),Wechsler Test of Adult Reading
(WTAR; Wechsler, 2001), Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS;
Overall and Gorham, 1962), Brief Negative Symptom Scale (BNSS;
Kirkpatrick et al., 2011), the Scale for the Assessment of Negative
Symptoms (SANS; Andreasen, 1984), and the Clinical Assessment
Interview for Negative Symptoms (CAINS; Forbes et al., 2010).2.3. Task
The task was programmed in E-Prime and administered via com-
puter. The task narrative is presented in Supplementary material
along with an example test stimulus (Supplementary Fig. 1). Partici-
pants were presented with two prospects that differed in EV and
responded by clicking on their chosen prospect. Prospects were para-
metrically manipulated by adjusting the probability of winning and
the magnitude of reward to cover a range of EVs. Participants were
instructed to select the prospect that they thought would maximize
return. Participants were told at the beginning of the experiment
that the probabilities and magnitudes were veridical and that out-
comes on one trial did not inﬂuence outcomes on later trials.
Magnitude information was presented pictorially (casino chips)
and in text ($0.02 per unit), while probability information was
presented pictorially (chance wheel with 10 segments, probability
of winning indicated via ﬁlled in sections). There were 10 blocks,
with 17 trials per block (14 test stimuli; 3 control stimuli). Side of
presentation was counterbalanced within prospect pairs and trial
order was randomized within blocks. Participants were told that
they would receive the money that they won, translated as $0.02
per magnitude unit.
Pairs of stimuli comprising fourteen EV-ratios were presented to
the participant 10 times each. Reward probabilities ranged from 0.6
to 0.8 (Prospect 1) and 0.2 to 0.4 (Prospect 2). Reward magnitudes
ranged from 1 to 4 (Prospect 1) and 2 to 5 (Prospect 2). This gave
EV-ratios that ranged from −0.91 to 0.91 (see Table 1 in (Sharp
et al., 2012) for the full set of combinations used). Three catch trials
were included, in each of the three pairs: 1) one Prospect had greater
magnitude and probability, 2) one had the same magnitude but dif-
ferent probability, and 3) one had the same probability but different
magnitude. In these catch trials, the most optimal Prospect was
obvious. These trialswere used to assess if subjectswere approaching
the task rationally.
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The EV of each condition was calculated according to an idealized
rational decision maker (though see below allowing for non-linear
utilities), where EV is calculated by:
EV ¼ RewardMagnitude  RewardProbability ð1Þ
A comparison between two competing EVs wasmade by calculating
the ratio between the EV of choice 1 versus the EV of choice 2:
EVratio ¼
EV1−EV2
EV1 þ EV2 =2 ð2Þ
The EV ratio informs themost appropriate action to take between
two choices. Prospectswith the highest reward probabilitywere arbi-
trarily designated as Prospect 1.
A two parameter sigmoidal function was ﬁt using hierarchical
Bayesian non-linear regression, whereby overarching parameters in-
form subject level parameters through shrinkage towards a common
estimate. The priors could be described asmildly informative and did
not bias towards an effect of group (See supplementary material for
model priors and further modeling information). Parameter k de-
scribes the shift in intercept, where a positive value indicates bias to-
wards prospect 1. Parameter λ describes the steepness of the slope at
themid-point, where a positive value indicates enhanced EV discrim-
ination. Model 1 (M1) was deﬁned as:
P Prospect1ð Þ ¼ 1
1þ exp −λ EVratio x; pð Þ þ kð Þð Þ ð3Þ
A secondmodel (M2) included Prospect and Prelec functionmod-
iﬁers to reward magnitude and probability respectively (Sharp et al.,
2012) that make non-linear adjustments to reward magnitude and
probability to make them more consistent with the subjective ap-
praisal of magnitude and probability (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). The Prospect and Prelec functions adjusted reward magni-
tudes and probabilities such that:
Subjective Magnitude ¼ Magnitude0:57 ð4Þ
Subjective Probability ¼ e − − log Probabilityð Þð Þ
0:77ð Þ ð5Þ
EV ratios were then calculated as in formulas 1 and 2.
2.5. Alternate models
The alternative models included independent contributions of
frequency and magnitude and were incorporated as the difference
in probability or magnitude between the two prospects:
ΔProb ¼ ProbabilityProspect1−ProbabilityProspect2 ð6Þ
ΔMag ¼ MagnitudeProspect1−MagnitudeProspect2 ð7Þ
Positive estimates for the intercept indicate a bias towards
selecting Prospect 1. For the ﬁrst of the alternate models, model 3
(M3), the probability of selecting Prospect 1 was:
P Prospect1ð Þ ¼ 1
1þ e− β0þβProb ΔProbð ÞþβMag ΔMagð Þð Þ
ð8Þ
providing a base model for the remaining model additions.
Models 4 and 5 (M4 andM5) incorporated estimation of the Prospect
and Prelec theory functions. Finally, model 6 (M6) incorporated themagnitude for both prospects, accounting for the visual impact of
the magnitude of reward:
P Prospect1ð Þ ¼ 1
1þ e− β0þβProb ΔProbPRELECð ÞþβMag ΔMagPROSPECTð ÞþβVisMag MagPrsopect1þMagProspect2ð Þ0:5ð Þð Þ
ð9Þ
Models were ﬁt using the Monte Carlo sampler Stan 2.8.2 (Stan
Development Team, 2013) and R version 3.2 (R Development Core
Team, 2013). Model comparisons used the widely applicable infor-
mation criteria (WAIC) (Watanabe, 2013), leave-one-out-cross-
validation information criteria (LOO-IC) (Vehtari et al., 2015), and ex-
pected log posterior difference (ELPDdiff) of the WAIC and LOO-IC.
Credible differences between groups were determined through esti-
mation of the 95% credible intervals of the contrast estimates.
3. Results
3.1. Participants
Nineteen out of 34 (56%) control participants showed error free
performance on catch trials compared to 16 out of 49 (33%) in the pa-
tient group (χ2(df=1) = 3.5, p= 0.06).We excluded one patient who
performed poorer than 60% correct on catch trials (exclusion criteria
from Sharp et al., 2012). Four patients and four controls did not show
any deviation from responding by selecting the prospect with a
higher probability of gain in every trial (Prospect 1). There was little
difference in the results when these participants were excluded, so
these participants were kept in the analysis giving 44 patients and
30 controls. Demographic characteristics are presented in Table 1.
3.2. Sharp et al. model
Fig. 1 presents the averaged performance by EV-ratio across
groups, and logistic regression curves derived from the full posterior
(the density of the ﬁne curves can be treated as a continuous credible
interval of the curve ﬁt and signiﬁcant overlap indicates no credible
differences between curve ﬁts). Fig. 1 shows that both groups
performed with a strong bias towards Prospect 1 as would be
expected based on the results in (Sharp et al., 2012). There was a
credible reduction in the slope parameter λ in patients, indicating
lower sensitivity to EV. There was not a credible difference in the
shift/bias (k) parameter.
3.3. Alternate models
Due to consistent data departures from the ﬁtted model shown
here (jagged ﬁt in Fig. 1) and in Sharp et al. (2012), we hypothesized
that these deviations could be captured by taking into account varia-
tions in sensitivity to probability and magnitude. Alternate models
separating out these effects of probability and magnitude were ﬁtted
(see Methods). Themodel ﬁts in Supplementary Table 1 are present-
ed in increasing order of complexity. The logistic regression
models gave improvements in ﬁt reﬂected by reductions in LOO-IC
and WAIC (Supplementary Table 1, see M3 vs M2 contrast).
Both LOO-IC and WAIC indicated the best ﬁtting model was M6
against all other models except for M5, where the ELPDdiff ratio
[ELPDdiff/SE(ELPDdiff)] was b2. Given the complexity of M6, we also
provide a comparison model M4 that was simpler, yet still well
performing, in the Supplementary material.
Fig. 1 illustrates the curve ﬁts to the data. There were no credible
differences between patients and controls evident in M6. There was,
however, a credible reduction in probability sensitivity (but notmag-
nitude sensitivity) in patients seen in M4 and M5 (see M4 in Supple-
mentary Fig. 2), which was consistent with the direction of the effect
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magnitude andprobability are combined into a single predictor inM1
and M2, while the logistic regression models separate these effects
into independent contributions that may both contribute to the ef-
fect, potentially making it more difﬁcult to ﬁnd an effect of diagnosis
in this instance.3.4. Correlations
To reduce the number of correlations performed model parame-
ters for the intercept, probability sensitivity and magnitude sensitiv-
ity from all alternative models (M3–M6) were averaged together to
form model averaged parameter estimates. This was considered a
suitable compromise as the magnitude of the correlations across
models M3–6 were consistent, increasing conﬁdence that notable
correlations were unlikely to be idiosyncratic for a particular model.
Table 2 presents Spearman's correlation coefﬁcients for the task.
Therewere strong correlations betweenmodeled parameters and es-
timated full-scale IQ, indicating that the ability to use Probability,
Magnitude and the synthesis of Probability and Magnitude into EV
is related with cognitive ability. We also observed negative associa-
tions between magnitude sensitivity and Negative symptom scores
from the BPRS Negative factor; the Alogia, Affective Bluntening, and
Avolition subscales from the SANS; and the Emotional Expressivity
subscale from the BNSS (Fig. 2 illustrates the correlations between
magnitude sensitivity and the total negative symptom scores).
In addition, estimated full-scale IQ was correlated with BPRS
Negative symptoms (ρ=−0.31, p = 0.03) but not with SANS total
(ρ=−0.19, p = 0.20), CAINS total (ρ=−0.13, p = 0.40), or BNSS
total (ρ=−0.19, p = 0.20).
Red = p b 0.05, Bold Red = p b 0.01; Int = intercept, Prob =
Probability Sensitivity, Mag = Magnitude Sensitivity, MagE = Mag-
nitude Effect, Prosp = Prospect Function, Prelec = Prelec Function.Fig. 1. Curve ﬁts and group parameter estimates (+95% HDI) for the Sharp et al. model M2
represent the median of the posterior estimates, while the faint lines represent a single cu
median probability of selecting prospect 1 across each EV-ratio. The adjusted EV-ratio for the
functions. N = 30 controls, 44 people with schizophrenia.4. Discussion
We observed a reduction in EV sensitivity in patients using a
model that combines probability and magnitude information into a
single EV-ratio estimate. After isolating the independent contribu-
tions of probability and magnitude on prospect selection with the al-
ternative models, probability integration may have been a driver of
the reduced EV sensitivity in patients (e.g., results from M4 Supple-
mentary Fig. 2). However, it was magnitude sensitivity that was sig-
niﬁcantly associated with negative symptoms, consistent with our
hypothesis that deﬁcits in magnitude integration would be ampliﬁed
in patients with high negative symptoms.
The Sharp et al. (2012) models showed reduced sensitivity to EV
in patients, suggesting that they are less able to integrate probability
and magnitude information even on simpliﬁed tasks. EV sensitivity
was strongly correlated with IQ, but not with positive or negative
symptoms (although the correlation between SANS Avolition and
EV-sensitivity = −0.24), suggesting patient impairments were
more related to cognitive ability rather than symptoms. This is to be
expected, as higher cognitive capacity would better equip partici-
pants to perform the calculations needed for integrating EV from
probability andmagnitude. Nevertheless, it is still an important ﬁnding
that cognitive ability in patients with schizophrenia can impede opti-
mal decisionmaking through an inability to effectivelyweigh evidence.
The Sharp et al. (2012) model, failed to capture some systematic
deviations in the data. To account for these deviations, we ﬁt a series
of logistic regression models with independent contributions from
probability and magnitude. These models were increasingly able to
catch departures from the smoothed EV-ratio curves, reﬂected by
improvements in ﬁt statistics.
Using the bestﬁtting logistic regressionmodel, therewas no cred-
ible group difference between patients and controls on any of the six
parameters obtained. However, there was reduced sensitivity for
probability information in some of the simpler models (e.g., M4 &(Left) andmodel M6 from the alternative logistic regression models (Right). Solid lines
rve ﬁt to one posterior sample from the Bayesian model. Crosses represent the group
Sharpmodel reﬂects the EV-ratio after accounting for the constant Prospect and Prelec
Table 2
Spearman correlation coefﬁcients between model parameters and neuropsychological
and symptom variables.
Sharp
et al.
model
Logistic
regression
model
Averaged
Int Slope Int Prob Mag
Patients + Controls
WASI IQ −0.43 0.61 −0.10 0.44 0.70
Controls
WASI IQ −0.18 0.42 −0.09 0.12 0.42
Patients
WASI IQ −0.51 0.48 −0.35 0.27 0.56
BPRS
AGD 0.16 −0.19 0.03 0.05 −0.20
Negative 0.21 −0.16 0.12 −0.22 −0.37
Reality distortion 0.03 0.01 −0.14 −0.05 0.02
Disorganization 0.05 0.09 0.15 −0.04 −0.05
Total 0.28 −0.16 0.11 −0.18 −0.30
SANS
Anhedonia asociality 0.02 0.11 −0.12 −0.07 0.01
Avolition 0.16 −0.24 0.01 −0.25 −0.31
Affective bluntening 0.09 −0.14 −0.05 −0.22 −0.31
Alogia 0.18 −0.13 0.08 −0.21 −0.33
Total 0.10 −0.08 −0.04 −0.20 −0.25
BNSS
Motivation and pleasure 0.07 −0.11 −0.05 −0.14 −0.19
Emotional expressivity 0.16 −0.12 0.05 −0.20 −0.30
Total 0.11 −0.13 −0.02 −0.22 −0.27
Medication
Haloperidol equivalents 0.37 −0.25 0.08 −0.45 −0.36
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above using the combined EV-sensitivitymodels (M1 andM2). How-
ever, it was only magnitude sensitivity that was associated with both
cognitive ability and negative symptoms. Importantly, the relation-
ships between magnitude sensitivity and negative symptoms were
generally consistent across different negative symptom scales, in-
creasing conﬁdence in the association.We initially hypothesized a re-
lationship between negative symptoms and magnitude integration
based on the reduced ability to track gain and lossmagnitudes, noting
that patients with greater negative symptoms were disproportion-
ately excluded for poor catch trial performance (Brown et al., 2013).
The cluster of symptom sub-scales that were signiﬁcantly associated
with magnitude sensitivity were SANS Avolition, SANS AffectiveFig. 2.Model averagedmagnitude sensitivity (averaged overM3-M6) as a function of total ne
toms was signiﬁcantly associated with magnitude sensitivity, and while SANS total and B
contained several subscales that were signiﬁcant (see Table 2).Bluntening, SANS Alogia and the BNSS Emotional Expressivity Scale,
spanning experiential and expressive dimensions of negative
symptoms. These associations are tempered by the lack of a credible
contrast between patients and controls on magnitude sensitivity,
suggesting that the associations with negative symptomsmay reﬂect
a more general association not speciﬁc to the pathophysiology of
schizophrenia. Nevertheless, given that the OFC is a critical compo-
nent of the representation of reward magnitude (Frank and Claus,
2006), these ﬁndings suggest that some aspects of negative symptom
formation may be related to poor OFC evaluation and a resultant de-
valuation of the possible expected future utility of reinforcement.
We (Gold et al., 2013) and others (Barch et al., 2014; Fervaha
et al., 2013) have shown that patients with high negative symptoms
were less willing to expend effort for greater reward, suggesting that
effort is either more aversive or that reward valuation is reduced,
thereby decreasing the cost-reward ratio. The associations presented
here between reward magnitude and negative symptoms support
the reward devaluation explanation, i.e., reduced reward magnitude
sensitivity would impair efﬁcient effort allocation. Interestingly, the
ability to accurately appraise prospects was related to general cogni-
tive ability andmay also be tied to OFC function, potentially offering a
parallel account of decisionmaking performance in patients. Notably,
this was despite our attempts to minimize the inﬂuence of cognitive
complexity on decision making, implicating more directly general
cognitive ability and reward magnitude appraisal. Overall, these re-
sults are consistent with the idea that negative symptoms represent
a failure to appropriately estimate and maintain future reward mag-
nitude/utility, whether through concomitant general cognitive ability
impairments or more speciﬁcally through OFC dysfunction.Funding
This work was supported by National Institute of Mental Health
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NSS total were not signiﬁcant, the effect size was similar to BPRS Negative and they
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Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://
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